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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY - IMMUNITY OF 
AGENT OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO STATE TAXATION - E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours and Company contracted with the Atomic Energy Commission to 
construct and operate the Savannah River Project for development of the 
hydrogen bomb for a fee of one dollar. Under the contract du Pont was to 
purchase all materials and supplies with funds furnished by the United 
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States, title to vest in the government immediately when it passed from the 
vendor. South Carolina attempted to apply its sales and use taxes to these 
purchases.1 In an action by the United States and du Pont before a 
statutory2 three-judge district court to enjoin collection of these taxes, held, 
injunction granted, one judge dissenting. The purchases by du Pont are 
exempt from state taxation because du Pont was acting as an agent of the 
federal government. United States v. Livingston, 179 F. Supp. 9 (E.D. S.C. 
1959). 
The power of the states to tax activities within their territory creates an 
inherent conflict between the interest of the federal government in protect-
ing its activities from interference and the interest of the states in finding 
and maintaining sources of revenue. The doctrine of implied immunity 
of the federal government from state taxation was developed to resolve this 
conflict.a Although early applications of the doctrine also gave immunity 
to private persons and organizations performing services for the federal 
government,4 the Supreme Court has in more recent decisions virtually 
eliminated this "derivative" immunity.5 Underlying this change is an 
awareness of the vast increase in spending by the federal government, the 
new activities in which it is engaging, the decrease in the sources of revenue 
available to the states resulting from the application of the immunity doc-
trine, and the need of the states for greater revenue to perform their in-
creasing governmental services. In its decisions the Court has relied on a 
test of "legal incidence": a tax imposed directly on the federal government 
or its agent is invalid; but if the effects are felt only indirectly, the tax is 
valid.a The Court has also implied that if the activity taxed is directly 
beneficial to the contractor, the tax is valid.7 However, any benefit which 
du Pont might derive from the activity in the principal case would be only 
indirect and incidental. Many difficulties have arisen in the application of 
the legal incidence test to attempts to tax government contractors, and the 
Court has been forced to place much reliance on the terms of the contract 
l s.c. CODE §65-1401 (1952) (sales tax); s.c. CODE §65-1421 (1952) (use tax). 
228 u.s.c. §2281 (1958). 
8 The doctrine originated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
4 E.g., Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218 (1928); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 
257 U.S. 501 (1922); Dobbins v. Erie County, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 435 (1842). Immunity was 
also applied reciprocally to exempt certain activities of tbe states from federal taxation. 
E.g., Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870); Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas, 285 
U.S. 393 (1932); Indian Motorcyle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931). The derivative 
immunity doctrine was based on tbe theory tbat if the government's employees and con-
tractors were forced to pay state taxes, tbe government would have to pay higher rates of 
compensation and tbus would be subject to an economic burden. 
IS E.g., Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); Alabama v. King and Boozer, 314 
U.S. 1 (1941); Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (overruling Collector v. Day, supra 
note 4); Helvering v. Mountain Producer's Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) (overruling Gillespie 
v. Oklahoma, supra note 4); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). 
6 E.g., Kem-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954); United States v. Allegheny 
County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944). See Van Bracklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886), 
1 See United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). 
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involved in each case. For example, in one case a state sales tax was held 
valid in its application to a cost-plus fixed fee contractor who purchased 
goods with his own funds and who took title to the goods himself, later 
conveying them to the government;8 whereas, in another case a similar tax 
was held invalid because under the terms of the contract the government 
directly paid for the goods and title passed from the vendor to the govern-
ment.9 Since in the principal case the goods were purchased with money 
furnished by the government and title passed directly to it,10 the tax was 
properly invalidated under the legal incidence test. Thus, this formal test 
enables the parties to a transaction to remove it from taxation by the in-
clusion of technical contractual provisions. Unfortunately, the test provides 
no room for a consideration of the need of the states for more revenue in the 
face of the rising costs of providing services and the increasing activities of 
the federal government. Also, this test fails to examine the basic issue in-
volved - whether the particular tax is a sufficient interference with the 
performance of a federal function to require immunity.11 Since the basic 
reason for the immunity doctrine is to protect the federal government 
against "interference" by the states,12 and since a mere economic burden has 
been declared not to be an interference,13 it would seem that the only tax 
which could interfere would be one which discriminates against the federal 
government.14 Therefore, it would seem that a satisfactory resolution of 
the basic conflict requires a test which looks behind the formal incidence of 
the tax to the question whether there is an interference, in the sense of a 
discrimination, with the performance of a federal function.Hi This test 
would not necessarily mean the destruction of the immunity doctrine, for 
Congress has always had the undoubted right to grant an express immunity 
to any activity or function of the government.16 Moreover, the determina-
tion to grant an immunity is a peculiarly proper one for the legislature, for 
s Alabama v. King and Boozer, supra note 5. 
9 Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, supra note 6. 
10 Principal case at 17. 
11 Whether the tax is laid directly on the federal government has little relation to 
its effect on the performance of the federal function. For example, if the incidence of the 
tax in the principal case were on the vendor, rather than on the vendee, it would raise the 
price of the goods sold and thus have the same ultimate effect on the federal government, 
but the tax would be proper under the legal incidence test. 
12 In McCulloch v. Maryland, supra note 3, the Court said, at 436: " ... the states have 
no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, 
the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the 
powers vested in the general government." 
13 E.g., United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); Alabama v. King and 
Boozer, supra note 5; James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra note 5. 
14 This is the type of tax which was struck down in McCulloch v. Maryland, supra 
note 3. For a recent example, see Philips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School 
District, 361 U.S. 376 (1960). 
15 Cf. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter). 
16E.g., Carson v. Roane-Anderson, 342 U.S. 232 (1952); Bank of New York v. Super-
visors, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26 (1868). See also James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra note 6. 
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it is only in Congress that an equitable balance between the confilcting in-
terests of the federal government and the states can be determined. Congress 
is able to solve both facets of the problem by providing for immunity to 
whatever extent is necessary, and by providing for payments in lieu of taxes 
to reimburse states and municipalities for the additional services which they 
must perform for employees of federal projects within their territory.17 
Congress, or the federal agency involved, can also determine what added 
benefit is derived by the state by the presence of the federal project and 
adjust the payments in lieu of taxes accordingly.18 In this manner the con-
flicting interests can be balanced and a decision reached which benefits each 
branch of the government without unduly harming the other.19 
Robert M. Steed, S.Ed. 
17 The present Atomic Energy Act provides for payments in lieu of taxation. 68 Stat. 
952 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §2208 (1958). However, the payments are only in lieu of property 
taxes and are limited to that amount which would have been payable if the property were 
owned by a private person. Il this provision were expanded to include a consideration of 
the sales and use ta.xes which would be payable, the difficulty exemplified in the principal 
case would be removed. 
18 Some of the other statutes which provide for payments in lieu of taxes are 54 Stat. 
626 (1940), 16 U.S.C. §8!lll (1958) (Tennessee Valley Authority); 68 Stat. 95 (1954), !l!l 
U.S.C, §986 (1958) (Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation); 6!l Stat. 428 (1949), 
as amended, 42 U.S.C. §1410 (h) (1958) (Public Housing Administration). See also H. REP. 
No. 70!1, Slid Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). 
10 See U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERCOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A STUDY COMMITTEE RE-
PORT ON PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES AND SHARED REVENUES (1955). 
